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Echoes of Beauty 
In Memory of Pleshette DeArmitt  
Elaine P. Miller 
Miami University  
There is a special poignancy to the fact that Pleshette DeArmitt's essay 
"Sarah Kofman's Art of Affirmation" foregrounds Freud's essay "On 
Transience," in which he muses on the fact that beauty seems to be 
inextricably linked to a fleeting existence.  As DeArmitt writes, "beauty, even 
in full flowering, foreshadows its own demise, causing what Freud describes 
as 'a foretaste of mourning.'"1  Such a transience, in Freud's mind, increases 
rather than decreases the worth of all that is beautiful.2 In her essay, 
DeArmitt argues that Kofman's 1985 text Mélancolie de l'Art reinscribes 
Freud's text, but brings it into the present by pointing to contemporary art as 
the occasion for the opening up of a new space, one capable of "dislocat[ing] 
the space of representation and meaning" and "invent[ing] a space of 
indetermination and play.”3  Through dislocation of a fixed reference or 
meaning and opening up a place for indeterminacy and play, contemporary 
art acknowledges and celebrates, rather than regrets, the transience of 
beauty. 
In her introduction to Sara Kofman's Corpus, which she co-edited with 
Tina Chanter, DeArmitt writes that Kofman described the art of modernity, 
in particular that of Kandinsky, Magritte, and Bacon, as figurative but non-
mimetic.  Kofman argued that such art presents something that goes beyond 
the descriptive capabilities of linguistic discourse, and thus the question of 
the meaning of the this new figurative order of art cannot be definitively 
answered, even by a theory such as her own; in other words, art poses 
questions, rather than giving answers.  DeArmitt's own philosophy is also 
informed by this capacity of contemporary art to suggest and question, and 
her monograph The Right to Narcissism features an "elegant and spare" 
portrayal, by the artist Billy Zane, of Echo and Narcissus.   
DeArmitt traces Kofman’s rejection of a certain understanding of the 
meaning of beauty, which, for the sake of simple reference, I will call (as she 
does) “Platonic.” Kofman describes this ideal as “an unchanging, eternal, 
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marmoreal beauty that nothing can taint, wither, or ravage" which, "in 
contrast to physical beauty, is not destined to decay.”4 We might compare 
this ideal beauty, which escapes all evanescence and decline, and of which 
all earthly beauty is but a pale shadow, to a self-enclosed and replete 
narcissism that eschews any flaw and indeed any relation to temporality at 
all.  Kofman explores this kind of aesthetic narcissism in her reading of 
Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, a story in which Basil, an artist, 
discovers in Dorian Gray, his model and muse, the “secret wonder he is 
seeking…of which the visible beauty of Dorian is just a shadow or a mere 
pattern.”5 
In dismantling the Platonic ideal of beauty, Kofman chooses to focus on 
the figure of the flower, which has traditionally often been chosen by writers 
to represent ideal beauty (and indeed Wilde’s text is full of flowers).  From 
Ovid to Kant, the flower has been used, in Kofman’s words, as a figure of 
protection from the “loss of our narcissistic securities,” which threatens 
beauty as well as life.6  As DeArmitt notes, Narcissus, in the myth recounted 
by Ovid, not only is a beautiful young man, but also becomes a beautiful 
flower.  Unlike the ideal beauty that they stand in for, however, actual 
flowers are fragile and transient.  The Narcissus flower, in contrast to both 
the youth, who perishes, or idealized beauty, which endures unchanged, is 
in fact a “symbol of the evanescence of human beauty and its imposture,” 
for, even as it manifests fragility, it “makes us believe in the illusion” of its 
impossible eternity.7  This doubleness in time, simultaneous transience and 
apparent eternity, finitude and a beautiful mask that protects us from our 
anxiety in the face of this finitude, characterizes both beauty and narcissism 
understood in the more complex sense traced by DeArmitt in her later work. 
Successful art has this fundamental duality, which Kofman discusses in 
terms of the Nietzschean distinction between the Dionysian and Apollinian 
aesthetic forces, where the Dionysian force is destructive of individual form 
in a way that is at once terrifying, intoxicating and unifying, and the 
Apollinian force gives rise to a series of dream-like and measured images.8  
This duality is not to be interpreted in the simple or straightforward sense 
that Apollo's images give us solace from the intolerable truth of Dionysus, 
that is, as a divine illusion, however. Rather, in the words of Derrida 
commenting on Kofman's work on Nietzsche, which DeArmitt in turn cites, 
art understood as indeterminacy or play among two forces manifests a 
certain "affirmation of art…even in its function of occultation or illusion, the 
non-illusory life of an illusion, manifesting, affirming and still holding on to 
life, carrying it living right to its limit."9 This is what Kofman refers to as the 
"imposture of art".  Life’s limit, be it death, or suffering, would be intolerable 
if not for this joyous affirmation in indeterminacy and play and in 
dislocation of reference and meaning, one that nonetheless recognizes and 
acquiesces to its own nature as illusion. 
E l a i n e  P .  M i l l e r  |  6 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIII, No 2 (2015)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2015.704 
DeArmitt's reconceptualization of Narcissus in her 2014 monograph The 
Right to Narcissism reflects this second relationship of the Dionysian to the 
Apollinian as interpreted by Kofman and Derrida in their reading of 
Nietzsche.  Apollo's dream images interpreted as a Schopenhauerian 
detachment shielding us from the Dionysian abyss of existence would align 
with the idea of a beauty that endures untouched by time.  To understand 
the relationship between the Dionysian and the Apollinian as a knowing 
and playful imposture, by contrast, is to conceptualize art as the non-illusory 
life of an illusion.  While Narcissus might initially seem to be a figure for a 
kind of delusional imposture, one that, in Kofman's words, appears to 
protect us "from any fall, any flaw, failure, defilement, degradation, 
corruption—from ruin, the defeat with which, in reality, beauty itself is 
fatally threatened,"10 in fact there is a kind of knowingness in this new, richer 
sense of narcissism that allows us to rightfully call it, along with art, a non-
illusory life of an illusion.  In this new, more complex sense of narcissism 
that DeArmitt uncovers in the texts of Rousseau, Kristeva, and Derrida, a 
fundamental doubleness perdures that I will relate to Beauvoir’s Ethics of 
Ambiguity. 
While DeArmitt’s earlier article on Kofman concerns the dual capacity 
of art to both unmask and affirm a peculiar type of illusion, her monograph 
outlines a doubleness or ambiguity (Beauvoir uses the word in its 
etymological significance) that we might call both structural in the formation 
of the self in its relations to others and the world, and existential.  She traces 
a specific form of experience in which "the relation to the other is 
fundamental to the formation of the self and its narcissism, while at the same 
time [it] interrupts the self's return to itself."11   She links the narcissistic 
circuit of self-return to the history of the constitution of the atomic 
philosophical subject, and to that of the democratic citizen "who recognizes 
himself first and foremost as the subject of rights."12  She cites Derrida, who 
argues that "the history of the rights of 'man,' beginning with the right to 
recognize oneself as a man" belongs to the "metaphysical movement of 
specular self-relation."13  The legacy of the rights of man is inextricably 
bound up with the "autos of autonomy, symmetry, homogeneity, the same, 
the like," to the point of insisting that if the other is involved, it must be one 
who is similar, like him.14  
In terms of the discourse of subjectivity and human rights, being closed 
to any other except the one who resembles me correlates to the eternity of 
the traditional "narcissistic" vision of beauty, and thus this structural and 
existential sense of doubleness can be related back to Kofman’s discourse on 
art.  A transformed sense of narcissism would, then, correlate to a theory of 
beauty that acknowledges time, transience, and loss.  This more complex 
sense of narcissism would be one that is open to the other, even the one with 
whom I have nothing in common.  In DeArmitt’s argument, for Rousseau, 
this experience lies in what he calls pitié, or empathy; for Kristeva, in 
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“transference love”; and for Derrida, in the context of an open-ended 
mourning that is both structural and singular.15  
The theories on developmental narcissism of all three of these thinkers 
express an ambiguity in the Beauvoirian sense, that is, both a fundamental 
two-ness, but also a dynamic, changing temporal existence whose meaning 
is never fixed, must continually be won.16  Much of Beauvoir's work 
advocates an existentialist struggle against the reifying plenitude that results 
when one attempts to constitute oneself as a self-enclosed and motionless 
thing or the embodiment of an ideal.  In The Second Sex, Beauvoir defines 
narcissism as the attempt to "accomplish the impossible synthesis of the in-
itself and the for-itself."17  There, noting the limitations historically placed on 
women, she argues that in not being able to achieve self-realization through 
concrete projects and objectives, women are too often forced to find their 
reality in the immanence of their own person, either in the "motionless, 
silvered trap" of their appearance or in their fantasy life, a "'strength' or 
'virtue' as obscure," Beauvoir writes, "as phlogiston."18  
In The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir describes the serious man as 
similarly one who tries to achieve the impossible synthesis of the for-itself 
and in-itself.19  The serious world, where the child and to a certain extent 
woman lives, is constructed in advance by values, customs, and laws which 
they have not chosen and to which they have no choice but to conform.  The 
world appears as given in advance to the one on whom economic and social 
circumstances act, rather than being modifiable by her own acts.20 God, the 
ultimate plenitude of in-itself and for-itself, is the creation, in Beauvoir's 
mind, of serious "men" who desire "the regard of this existing Being to 
change [their] existence into being."21  Because the source of meaning is 
external to the serious persons and monolithic, they also require that others 
bend to its dictates for their own good. 
DeArmitt writes that what Derrida's corpus calls for, and that to which 
her own monograph responds, is "the coupling of the deconstruction of 
every narcissism of the One with the reconfiguring of a narcissism, and the 
'right' to it, that is more open to the other as other.22  Likewise, in Kofman's 
words, in repeating or doubling herself in the work of art the artist achieves 
“a nonpresence to self, an originary dissatisfaction, a death immanent in life, 
and the absence of any simple and full origin."23  
DeArmitt finds psychoanalytical inspiration for this deconstructed 
sense of narcissism in the work of Julia Kristeva, in particular in Kristeva's 
conception of self-love as a "'primary identity organization' that enables the 
emergence of a subject."24  Because Kristeva's account of narcissism involves 
the child's separation from fusion with the mother (or autoeroticism) toward 
an identification with a discursive Third, with whom it identifies and whose 
speech it incorporates, it is particularly central to DeArmitt's structural 
historical account of narcissism.  In becoming like the Third or loving Other, 
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the child may also begin to love herself and take up a "position of 
subjectivity transformed in and through the Other."25  Like Echo, the newly 
formed subject in process "catches the words, or simply the sounds, of the 
Other and delights in repeating, reproducing, and sending back the music 
that her ears have caught."26  
To trace this new sense of narcissism historically, DeArmitt begins by 
delimiting two levels of self-love in Rousseau: a more natural and healthy 
notion of amour de soi, which propels a vital existence, and a malignant form 
of self-love, amour propre, which is gained in society through vanity and 
comparison with others. Ultimately, DeArmitt argues, however, that 
Rousseau's condemnation of amour propre cannot be aligned with the 
moralist tradition that he inherits.  Rather than simply condemning amour 
propre, on DeArmitt's reading, Rousseau transforms it and devises a 
historically unprecedented conception of narcissism,27 that is, a fully fleshed 
out (and thus no longer simply natural) amour de soi that can only be made 
manifest through the socially constructed amour propre that the tradition out 
of which he arises condemns.28 
In addition to reworking the opposition between amour de soi and amour 
propre, Rousseau's concept of pitié also opens up a new way of thinking the 
relation between love of self and love of other, for pitié, or empathy derives 
from amour de soi, which propels every animal to tend to itself for its well-
being and self-preservation.  Empathy is amour de soi turned outward, 
tending toward the preservation of the species and not solely of the self. 
Neither pity nor this natural self-love are reflective or the product of 
imagination.  Amour propre, by contrast, is the product of imagination; it is 
the "functioning of the I as it is socially constituted."   Thus, DeArmitt 
argues, amour de soi can only persist in intersubjective life as a form of amour 
propre, one mediated by empathy for the needs of others, and thereby 
transformed into a virtue.29  This relationship bears a likeness to that 
between the Dionysian and the Apollinian in art; the framing of the 
Apollinian, despite its provisionality and artificiality, forms a means 
through which the Dionysian can be sustained and transformed.  
Kofman also calls this kind of relationship sublimation, arguing that the 
artist tries to repeat what the child does in play, that is, to repeat ever-
differently.  Calling sublimation a “little death” in that it effects a separation 
and thus partial liberation of the death drive, just as the child separates from 
the mother, Kofman argues that culture is possible only through regression, 
that is, through a liberation of death forces that allows for a splitting of the 
life forces into partial drives that can be channeled into self-enclosed entities 
like the subject and culture instead of constantly being discharged 
outwardly.30  As Freud notes in The Ego and the Id, sublimation is related in 
this way to ego-formation, since it involves a channeling of sexual aims 
ordinarily directed toward external objects back toward the "I" itself, which 
constitutes itself as an object in order to deepen its relations with the id and 
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gain control over it by making itself essentially self-loved.  Kofman argues 
that even more so in the case of artworks, which, like the ego, are a product 
of a specific form of desexualization, namely the transformation of object-
libido into narcissistic libido, “the artist is not really the ‘father’ of his 
works," but rather "it is instead the works that engender their father and are 
constitutive of his identity."31  Kofman emphasizes the narcissistic pleasure 
that is both a motivation for the creation of art and an effect of the 
experience of artworks, describing them, in terms of Andre Green's 
neologism, as “transnarcissistic objects” since both artist and public can 
share narcissistic pleasure in them, as reflections of personal and cultural 
achievement.32   
 Art's pleasure is a narcissistic one in the sense that it "rests essentially 
on a saving of expenditure, as 'narcosis.'" Life energy that would otherwise 
be directed outward toward an object of desire is instead held in reserve to 
feed the ego.  Narcissism, for Kofman is  'search for immortality" that "can 
only be achieved by mimicking death in life," that is, by sublimation in this 
specific sense.  It is a kind of "stockpiling of the self," one which lulls both 
the individual and the society into a contemplation of the values it has 
created.33  Beauvoir refers to this form of narcissism negatively as an ethics 
of being or saving; in storing up being, she argues, one aims at the stationary 
plenitude of the in-itself.  An ethics of existence, by contrast, in Beauvoir's 
words, "makes itself only by destroying."  She gives as an example the 
festival, where existence is celebrated as existence through consumption:  
"one eats, drinks, lights fires, breaks things, and spends time and money; 
one spends them for nothing."  Likewise, in songs, laughter, dances, 
eroticism, and drunkenness one seeks both an exaltation of the moment and 
a complicity with other people."34  Nevertheless, the "tension" and "pure 
negativity" of existence cannot maintain itself for very long, and so, for 
Beauvoir as for Kofman, one of art's roles is to "fix this passionate assertion 
of existence in a more durable way" without thereby transforming it into 
static being,35 just as the Apollinian provides a frame within which to 
endure, but not to deceptively deny, the negativity of the Dionysian. 
 DeArmitt discerns an analogous relationship between Echo and 
Narcissus, one which accords to Echo a role that is much more than a simple 
mimicking of Narcissus' words.  In reading Derrida in the third part of her 
book, DeArmitt notes that in Derrida’s reading the call of Echo is the sole 
means through which Narcissus can gaze at himself.36  Echo’s words both 
repeat and return something other, something unforeseeable, to Narcissus’ 
speech.  DeArmitt finds in this reading of Echo a figure for philosophy itself, 
the kind of philosophizing we all strive to do.  Citing Peggy Kamuf, she 
writes that Derrida chooses texts to “deconstruct” precisely because he feels 
an “impulse of identification” and “loving jealousy” toward them.37  The 
words of Echo not only mirror, but also transform what they reflect, opening 
up the possibility of reading something in a new way, in the manner of a 
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trans-narcissism opened up to the other, one that would not be a mere 
endless spinning in a self-enclosed void. 
 Pleshette's book eloquently argues for a conception of self-formation 
that remains open to the other.  Her Narcissus responds to the voice of Echo, 
who, outsmarting the law of reiteration, lets be heard "something other than 
what she is saying" so that she may speak "of herself and on her own" and 
not simply repeat his words.38  In this sense, Pleshette's philosophy also 
reflects the influence of Luce Irigaray, who argued that woman's role 
historically has been to function as the speculum of the other, the mirrored 
surface that reflects back to him his own self-absorbed image without herself 
coming to presence.39  For Pleshette, the mirror's surface, understood in this 
new way informed by Rousseau, Kristeva, and Derrida, may be able reflect 
Echo herself by virtue of her relation to the other, and not at her own 
expense.   
On a personal note, Pleshette's discussion of Echo's voice struck a chord 
with me, because when I think of her, I can still, above all, hear her voice, 
lovingly and gently mocking both herself and others, "the non-illusory life of 
an illusion, manifesting, affirming and still holding on to life, carrying it 
living right to its limit."  We mourn her, and our mourning is unfeasible.  In 
her own words:  "We must and must not get over the other, making the 
position of the survivor truly untenable, often unbearable, always 
impossible."40  We feel, in her absence, what Derrida called “la mort dans 
l’ame,” a death in the soul, because, as he said of Paul de Man, from now on 
we are destined to speak of her, instead of to and with her.41  We rejoice, 
however, that fragments of Pleshette's thought and life have been captured, 
however incompletely, in the ideas presented in these two strong and 
complementary texts she left behind. 
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